ARCTIC GEOPOLITICS

Ice-melting tensions

October 20, 2024

For the busiest:

  • All Arctic states except Russia are now NATO members

  • China’s growing influence in the region

  • Countries compete for economic rights over the Arctic Ocean

  • Climate change may open new shipping lanes

The Arctic is a distinctive economic, political, and environmental region, located around the North Pole of the Earth.

The Arctic Polar Circle (66° 34' North latitude) geographically defines it, but the region extends beyond it geopolitically.

The region supports diverse wildlife despite harsh climate with average summer temperatures below 10°C.

In 2019, air temperatures over some areas of the Arctic Ocean were 3-4°C above the 1981 to 2010 average.

The Arctic Ocean has been losing 12.2% of its permanent ice cover every 10 years since 1980.

No dedicated international treaty sets the legal foundations for the Arctic.

The region is partially regulated by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), as well as the national laws of Arctic states, and some agreements between them.

Why is the Arctic significant?

  • Unique location between North America, Europe and Asia

  • Holds approximately 13% and 30% of global undeveloped oil and natural gas reserves

  • As ice cover recedes, the Arctic Ocean becomes more navigable along the Northeast and Northwest Passages, boosting commercial and military potential

  • Shortest distance between Russia and the US lies through the Arctic, making it a key potential direction for a missile strike

The Arctic is home to approximately 4 million people, with around 10% of them being Indigenous – including the Inuit, the Sámi, and the Nenets, among others.

Economic activity in the Arctic is mostly related to oil, gas and minerals extraction, fishing, shipping, and tourism.

Nearly 25% of natural gas and 10% of crude oil globally are extracted in the Arctic.

Power dynamics

There are eight countries that have territories within the Arctic Circle - Canada, Denmark (with Greenland), Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden and the US. Together they form the Arctic Council.

The Arctic Council was established in 1996 for collaboration between the eight Arctic countries, indigenous representatives, and non-Arctic observer nations. Its decisions are not legally binding and cannot be enforced.

The interests of the indigenous population in the Arctic Council are represented by six Indigenous Peoples’ organizations that hold a status of permanent participants and have consultation rights on the Council’s decisions.

The Arctic Council does not interfere with military security matters.

Since the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, seven other Arctic Council countries have paused interactions with Russia on Arctic matters.

In its 2035 Arctic Strategy, Russia highlights the importance of military security and natural resource development in the region.

The Arctic currently accounts for up to 20% of Russian exports.

Since the 2010s, Russia is reopening its Soviet-era Arctic military bases and has upgraded its Northern Military Fleet with several new nuclear-powered submarines. It regularly conducts military training exercises in the region.

Russia has the largest fleet of icebreakers globally and is the only country to manufacture or operate nuclear-powered icebreakers.

Icebreakers are needed to maintain military and commercial presence in the regions of the Arctic Ocean covered by ice.

Nuclear ice breakers are powered by an on-board nuclear reactor, which allows them to operate for many months without returning to port. 

China, Japan, South Korea, India and Singapore were the first Asian countries to get Arctic Council observer status in 2013, formalising their interest in the Arctic affairs.

China became an active regional player through research projects and investments in mining assets, near-Acrtic infrastructure, and nuclear icebreakers. It has so far decided against buying current Russian nuclear icebreakers.

US plans for a new diesel-electric icebreaker were delayed from 2024 to 2027.

China and Russia have a history of joint military drills in the region, and this year have conducted joint coast guard patrol exercises in the Arctic Ocean for the first time.

The US military recognises long-term interest of Russia and China in the region, while planning to enhance its own infrastructure, icebreaker fleet and active-duty troops number in Alaska and Greenland.

The US calls for the rule-based order in the Arctic, as well as increased collaboration among NATO members in the region.

NATO as an organisation does not have an official Arctic strategy but its member countries conduct regular military exercises in the Canadian Arctic, Alaska, and the Nordics. 

In 2023 and 2024, the Arctic countries of Finland and Sweden joined NATO, following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Countries are racing for control over the region’s natural resources, especially by claiming economic rights over areas of the Arctic seafloor.

Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russia and the US are the countries that have direct access to the Arctic Ocean, its seabed and resources.

These countries share maritime (sea) borders in the Arctic Ocean.

Under UNCLOS, each country can use the continental shelf, seabed riches and any marine resources within their territorial waters (12 nautical miles from the coast) and Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) for up to 200 nautical miles beyond the territorial waters.

Countries can expand their EEZs further by making claims and providing geological evidence to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) to prove that their continental shelf naturally extends further from the coastline.

Canada, Norway, Denmark, and Russia submitted their requests to CLCS during the 2000s and 2010s. It resulted in multiple overlapping EEZ claims covering major parts of the Arctic Ocean basin and leaving only a small part of the Arctic seabed unclaimed.

CLCS offers non-binding recommendations. The conflicting countries are supposed to mutually negotiate their borders based on received recommendations. 

In 2023, the CLCS ruled that data behind most of Russia’s claim is valid, refusing some areas. This does not mean other countries’ claims data over these same areas will not be approved.

The claims by Canada and Denmark will be evaluated before recommendations on resolving the overlaps are given.

The US is the only Arctic country that has not yet ratified UNCLOS which prevents it from making any legal claims to CLCS.

No overlapping claims have so far been negotiated and resolved by the Arctic nations. 

Arctic states have the right to fish commercially within their EEZs, while it is prohibited in the Arctic high seas (neutral waters) under the Arctic Ocean Fisheries Agreement (CAOFA), effective from 2021 for 16 years.

The agreement provides scientists with time until 2037 to conduct in-depth research on high seas ecosystems and evaluate their commercial fishing potential.

CAOFA was signed as a legally binding international agreement by Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Norway, Russia, the US and 4 non-Arctic participants (China, Japan, South Korea, and the EU).

CAOFA is one of the first major milestones in legally recognising the role of non-Arctic nations in Arctic governance.

Climate change is improving the navigability of the two major Arctic shipping routes – the Northwest Passage and the Northeast Passage.

The Northwest Passage connects the Atlantic and the Pacific Oceans, while the Northeast Passage links Northeast Asia with Europe.

Canada sees the Northwest Passage as a part of its internal territorial waters with full control over vessels going through. The USA and other countries view it as an international strait open to any ships without Canadian permission.

The Northeast Passage (or the Northern Sea Route) partially goes through Russian territorial waters and is more navigable than the Northwest Passage. Russia claims full authority over the Northern Sea Route (NSR).

Russia demands foreign commercial ships obtain transit permits when using the passage, additionally requiring foreign warships to get Russian diplomatic clearance since 2022. 

In 2016, China and Russia announced their collaboration on the Polar Silk Road – a new trade route along the NSR to connect Asia and Europe, as an alternative to Suez Canal. 

China already uses the Polar Silk Road as one of the seasonal channels to get Russian liquified natural gas (LNG) supplies. Russia and China ultimately plan to establish a regular year-round transit in the passage.

Climate change also contributed to an increase in forest fires, mainly in the US, Canada and Sweden. Fire-related tree cover loss grew by approximately 3.6% per year during 2001-2023.

With changing environmental conditions, competing economic claims, and increasing involvement from non-Arctic nations, future regional dynamic is uncertain.

Historically, the region has been the ground of international cooperation, particularly through frameworks like the Arctic Council.

In 2012, Canada tried to set up military cooperation between all eight Arctic nations, including Russia, but these plans were abandoned following Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014.

The ongoing war in Ukraine has broken down relationships between Russia and the other Arctic nations who are all NATO members, as of 2024. 

The navigability of the Arctic shipping routes is expected to continue improving through the 21st century as polar ice melts.

The period of the year when Arctic navigation is possible will become longer, and the available routes more diverse.

As ice cover recedes, a new shipping lane through the middle of the Arctic may open during the summer, potentially affecting global trade.

Polar ships are projected to be able to navigate year-round along the North Sea Route by the year 2100. 

However, there is no direct relationship between melting ice cover and improved navigability.

As the Arctic Ocean changes from perennial (permanent) ice to season ice that melts in the summer and re-appears in the winter, the characteristics of the ocean change.

As large pieces of perennial ice break off and drift South, some shipping routes are expected to see reduced navigability, increased risk, and unexpected disruptions, including in the Northeast and the Northwest passages. 

The relative attractiveness of the Arctic shipping routes will also depend on the security of the traditional routes through the Suez Canal, which are currently affected by geopolitical tensions, particularly the Houthi Rebellion in Yemen.

Political, economic, and environmental initiatives in the Arctic will also have to consider the sustainability of indigenous communities. 

Arctic countries’ governments continue to work on legislation preserving Indigenous peoples’ rights. While further progress was made in Canada and the Nordics on land claims, self-determination and self-governance, there are issues with their consistent implementation.

Finally, improved connectivity is required to enhance security, education, and emergency response, since many Arctic areas still rely on limited satellite phone coverage and lack broadband infrastructure.

Author Ostap Salovskyi

Editor Anton Kutuzov

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